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Abstract
Background: The Orphan Drug Act (1983) established several incentives to encourage the
development of orphan drugs (ODs) to treat rare diseases and conditions. This study analyzed the
characteristics of OD designations, approvals, sponsors, and evaluated the effective patent and
market exclusivity life of orphan new molecular entities (NMEs) approved in the US between 1983
and 2007.
Methods: Primary data sources were the FDA Orange Book, the FDA Office of Orphan Drugs
Development, and the US Patent and Trademark Office. Data included all orphan designations and
approvals listed by the FDA and all NMEs approved by the FDA during the study period.
Results: The FDA listed 1,793 orphan designations and 322 approvals between 1983 and 2007.
Cancer was the main group of diseases targeted for orphan approvals. Eighty-three companies
concentrated 67.7% of the total orphan NMEs approvals. The average time from orphan
designation to FDA approval was 4.0 ± 3.3 years (mean ± standard deviation). The average
maximum effective patent and market exclusivity life was 11.7 ± 5.0 years for orphan NME. OD
market exclusivity increased the average maximum effective patent and market exclusivity life of
ODs by 0.8 years.
Conclusion: Public programs, federal regulations, and policies support orphan drugs R&D. Grants,
research design support, FDA fee waivers, tax incentives, and orphan drug market exclusivity are
the main incentives for orphan drug R&D. Although the 7-year orphan drug market exclusivity
provision had a positive yet relatively modest overall effect on effective patent and market
exclusivity life, economic incentives and public support mechanisms provide a platform for
continued orphan drug development for a highly specialized market.
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Background
On January 4, 1983, the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) went
into effect to encourage the development and marketing
of drugs (orphan drugs) to treat rare diseases and condi-
tions. This Act evolved in response to the small number of
orphan drugs that were approved in the U.S. in the years
prior the approval of the ODA [1]. Between 1967 and
1983, an estimated 58 new drugs were approved in the
U.S. that could have qualified for orphan status [2]
Initially, orphan drug status applied to products whose
sales in the U.S. market would not cover the costs incurred
during product development. However, opportunities to
recover these costs improved when the 1984 ODA amend-
ment expanded the definition of orphan drugs to include
products for any disease or condition that affects less than
200,000 persons in the U.S. In January 2008, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Rare Diseases (ORD)
listed 6,819 such rare diseases and conditions in the U.S.,
which afflicted an estimated 20 to 25 million Americans
[3-5]. Approximately 250 new rare diseases and condi-
tions are described each year [6].
In 1983, the ODA charged the FDA with the role of
reviewing and approving requests for orphan product des-
ignation, overseeing the seven year exclusive marketing
for orphan products, coordinating research study design
assistance for sponsors of orphan drugs, encouraging
sponsors to conduct open protocols, and awarding grants
for development of orphan drugs. These functions are per-
formed by the FDA Office of Orphan Products Develop-
ment (OOPD). The Orphan Drugs Board in the
Department of Health and Human Services was also
established by the ODA to promote the development of
orphan drugs and devices and to support a concerted
effort between the public and private sectors in this area.
The ODA established federal status for orphan drug devel-
opment, the so-called "orphan designation." OOPD's
granting of orphan designation for a specific product indi-
cation qualifies the sponsor for incentives provided under
the ODA. Although the original ODA allowed sponsors to
apply for orphan drug designation at any time during
product development or following FDA marketing
approval, the Orphan Drug Amendment of 1988 allowed
sponsors to apply for orphan drug designation at any time
prior to the submission of a marketing application for the
orphan indication. Thus, a sponsor may request orphan
drug designation for any unapproved use of a drug with-
out regard to whether other indications of the drug were
approved previously for marketing.
Through the ODA, several economic incentives were cre-
ated to stimulate orphan drug development and market-
ing. First, was the availability of grants, of which
approximately 12 – 15 grants are awarded annually to aca-
demic-based researchers or to companies [8]. Second, was
the establishment of a 50% tax credit for expenditures
incurred during the clinical testing phase for orphan drugs
being evaluated for their therapeutic potential. Congress
made the tax credit permanent from May 31, 1997. The
tax provisions also have a 20-year carry forward and a 1-
year fall back provision. Third, was the 7-year market
exclusivity provision granted for FDA-designated orphan
drug indications [8]. The ODAs 7-year market exclusivity
is a post-approval incentive that begins on the date of FDA
approval for the designated orphan indication. This
incentive addressed the limited opportunities to recover
R&D costs for drugs without patent protection. However,
exclusivity does not share the same level of protection as
a patent [9]. During the orphan market exclusivity period,
the FDA cannot approve a NDA (new drug application) or
a generic drug application for the same product and for
the same rare disease indication. The FDA could approve
a second application for the same drug for a different dis-
ease indication.
Although previous studies evaluated the effects of the
ODA on orphan drug designations and approvals, no
studies have evaluated the patent and market exclusivity
periods of orphan drugs [2,7,10-12]. Therefore, the objec-
tives of this study were to analyze the characteristics of the
orphan drugs designations and approvals, and their spon-
sors, and to evaluate the effective patent and market exclu-
sivity life of orphan NMEs approved in the US market
during the period 1983–2007.
Methods
The primary data sources used in this study were: the FDA
"Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations (i.e. Orange Book-OB) versions from 1983 to
2007, the electronic version of the OB, the FDA OOPD
List of Orphan Designations and Approvals, documents
and data from the FDA's website, and information about
patents abstracted from the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) website. Data were updated through
December 31, 2007. Data collection was based on a pro-
spective protocol developed by the authors. To guarantee
the reliability of the data collection, one researcher was
responsible for primary data extraction and placement
into evidence tables while a second researcher verified the
data extraction and entry process. Discrepancies between
the two researchers were discussed and resolved by a third
researcher. Algorithms were also used to ensure the accu-
racy and consistency of the data extraction process.
Data used in the analysis covered all orphan designations
and approvals/licenses listed by the FDA. The study also
included all orphan and non-orphan NMEs approved by
the FDA from 1983 to 2007. To be included in the analy-Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases 2008, 3:33 http://www.ojrd.com/content/3/1/33
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sis, a drug product had to be considered by the FDA as a
NME, and listed in the first NDA approved by the FDA for
the NME. Additionally, NMEs for drug products were
excluded from the patent analysis if they were: 1) never
marketed after FDA approval; 2) discontinued or with-
drawn from the market; or 3) found not to have at least
one patent listed in the OB at some point during the
period of analysis.
The unit of analysis was the first NDA and the first NDA
Product Number for each NME approved by the FDA dur-
ing the study period. The FDA review time was estimated
as the difference between the NDA approval date and the
NDA received day. The effective patent and market exclu-
sivity life includes the period from NDA approval to mar-
ket exclusivity and patent expiration. Patents with the
minimum and the maximum effective patent life were
used to estimate the minimum (first patent) and maxi-
mum (last patent) effective patent and market exclusivity
life when several patents were listed in the OB for a NME.
Summary descriptive statistics were computed for the var-
iables included in the analysis. Differences in proportions
were assessed using Chi-Square and Fisher's exact tests.
Group differences were assessed using group comparison
t-tests. Logarithm transformation was performed for non-
normal distributed variables. SPSS version 16 was used for
the analysis.
Results
Orphan designations and FDA approvals
On December 31, 2007, the FDA listed 1,793 orphan des-
ignations granted since 1983 (Table 1) [13]. These desig-
nations referred to 1,199 products and 889 diseases and
conditions. Cancer was the main group of diseases tar-
geted by orphan designations (31.7% of all designations).
Orphan designations for HIV/AIDS represented 4.9% of
total orphan designations during the study period.
The orphan designations were granted to 810 sponsors,
which included 95 universities, hospitals, public organi-
zations and individual sponsors. The majority of sponsors
had a low number of orphan designations with 509
(62.8%) sponsors having only 1 orphan designation
(Table 2). There was a single sponsor for 88.6% of the
products and 77.9% of the diseases and conditions tar-
geted by the orphan designations.
Between 1983 and 2007 the FDA approved 322 orphan
drugs. The orphan FDA approvals included 72 biologicals
(22.4%) and 250 drugs (77.6%). The approvals referred
to 239 unique products including 52 (21.7%) biologicals
and 188 (78.3%) drugs. The approvals targeted 238 differ-
ent diseases and conditions. Cancer was the main group
of diseases targeted by orphan approvals (25.5%). The
approvals were concentrated among 155 (19.1%) spon-
sors that also had 43.2% of the total orphan designations.
The FDA approval rate varied with the number of orphan
designations held by the sponsors. Sponsors with 1
orphan designation had a 9% FDA approval rate. Spon-
sors with more than 10 orphan designations had a 31%
FDA approval rate. Overall, 8.3% of the sponsors that had
5 or more orphan designations accounted for 60.2% of
the FDA approvals. After approval of the Orphan Drug
Amendments of 1988, the average time from orphan des-
ignation to FDA approval was 4.0 ± 3.3 years (n = 290).
New molecular entities orphan designations and approvals
The FDA approved 635 NMEs during the study period.
The first NDAs for 115 (18.1%) NMEs were approved by
the FDA for an orphan designated indication or indica-
tions (i.e. orphan NMEs). There were 8 orphan NMEs that
had 2 orphan designations for the first NDAs approval.
One of the orphan NMEs approved by the FDA in the
study period did not have an associated orphan market
exclusivity period listed in the OB.
Market approvals of orphan NMEs were concentrated in
83 companies that had 67.7% of the total orphan approv-
Table 1: FDA Orphan Drug Designations, Approvals and NMEs. 
U.S. 1983–2007
Year Designations Approvals NMEs
1983 1 2 1
1984 40 3 2
1985 48 7 3
1986 32 6 4
1987 59 9 4
1988 73 10 4
1989 76 12 3
1990 88 12 5
1991 79 13 7
1992 56 14 6
1993 63 13 6
1994 59 11 3
1995 55 11 5
1996 58 24 8
1997 52 19 4
1998 65 20 7
1999 73 19 6
2000 69 14 2
2001 75 6 3
2002 61 14 5
2003 95 14 4
2004 131 14 10
2005 123 20 6
2006 141 22 3
2007 121 13 4
Total 1793 322 115Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases 2008, 3:33 http://www.ojrd.com/content/3/1/33
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als and 29.0% of the total orphan designations. A higher
percentage of orphan NMEs than non-orphan NMEs (i.e.
other NMEs) was sponsored by companies that had only
1 NME approved during the study period (29.6% vs.
13.8%) (p < 0.001)
Statistically significant (p < 0.001) differences in favor of
orphan NMEs were found for the use of any Fast Track or
Subparts E/H review procedures (29.5% vs. 9.5%), and
also for NMEs given priority review by the FDA (83.5% vs.
35.4%). After natural logarithm transformation to achieve
normality of the data, significant differences (p < 0.001)
in FDA review time were revealed between orphan NMEs
(1.6 ± 1.4 years {mean ± standard deviation}) and other
NMES (2.2 ± 1.7 years). However, difference in FDA
review time between both groups of drugs was not statis-
tically significant when the analysis was performed for
subsets including priority review and standard review
NMEs.
NME patents and market exclusivity
The patent and market exclusivity analysis included 99 of
the 115 orphan NMEs and 421 of the 520 other NMEs
approved during the study period. Although the FDA
approved 4 antibiotic orphan NMEs and 37 other antibi-
otic NMEs before the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) during the study
period, by regulation, antibiotics approved between 1983
and 1997 could not have patents or market exclusivity
listed in the OB, other than orphan drug market exclusiv-
ity. Thus, antibiotics approved before FDAMA and prod-
ucts withdrawn from the market were excluded from
analysis. Also, in the study period there were 12 orphan
drug NME market discontinuations and 72 other NME
market discontinuations (including 10 antibiotics). Safety
was the reason for 16.7% (n = 2) of the orphan NMEs
market discontinuations (aprotinin bovine and lev-
omethadyl acetate hydrochloride) and the reason for
34.7% (n = 25) of other NMEs market discontinuations.
A significantly (p < 0.001) lower percentage of orphan
NMEs had patents compared to other NMEs listed in the
OB (67.7% vs. 89.5%). The FDA granted pediatric market
exclusivity to 9.1% of the orphan NMEs approved during
the study period and to 24.7% of the other NMEs (p <
0.001). Market exclusivity (including orphan and Wax-
man-Hatch market exclusivities) represented the longest
effective patent and market exclusivity period for a signif-
icantly (p < 0.001) higher percentage of orphan NMEs
compared to other NMEs (37.4% vs. 15.4%).
The minimum effective patent and market exclusivity life
(including orphan drug market exclusivity) was 9.9 ± 3.7-
years for orphan NMEs and 10.5 ± 4.1 years for other
NMEs (no statistically significant difference). The orphan
drug market exclusivity provision increased the minimum
effective patent and market exclusivity life of orphan
NMEs by an average of 0.9 years.
The maximum effective patent and market exclusivity life
(including orphan drug market exclusivity) was 11.7 ± 5.0
years for orphan NMEs and 13.9 ± 5.5 years for other
NMEs (p < 0.001). The orphan drug market exclusivity
provision increased the maximum effective patent and
market exclusivity life of orphan NMEs by an average of
0.8 years.
There were 19 (19.2%) orphan NMEs and 171 (32.8%)
other NMEs with generic competition in the study period.
Orphan NMEs had significantly less (p < 0.01) generic
competition than other NMEs. No generic or NDA com-
petitors entered the market prior to the expiration of the
Waxman-Hatch NME and the Orphan drug exclusivities.
Generic competitors for orphan NMEs entered the market
an average of 4.4 ± 3.9 years (range 0–11.5 years) after
expiration of the orphan drug market exclusivity. How-
ever, there were 3 orphan drugs that had generic entry
immediately after orphan drug market exclusivity expira-
tion, and 3 other orphan drugs that had generic entry in
Table 2: FDA Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals. U.S. 1983–2007
Number of 
Designations
Number of 
Sponsors
Orphan 
Designations
Orphan 
Designations 
per Sponsor
NDA 
Approvals
NDA 
Approvals 
per Sponsor
NDA 
Approvals 
per 
Designation
NME 
Approvals
NME 
Approvals 
per Sponsor
NME 
Approvals per 
Designation
1 509 509 1.0 48 0.09 0.09 18 0.04 0.04
2 140 280 2.0 40 0.29 0.14 20 0.14 0.07
3 61 183 3.0 28 0.46 0.15 7 0.11 0.04
4 33 132 4.0 12 0.36 0.09 4 0.12 0.03
5 14 70 5.0 8 0.57 0.11 5 0.36 0.07
6 8 48 6.0 9 1.13 0.19 8 1.00 0.17
7 11 77 7.0 24 2.18 0.31 10 0.91 0.13
8 7 56 8.0 16 2.29 0.29 3 0.43 0.05
9 3 27 9.0 10 3.33 0.37 3 1.00 0.11
10 or more 24 411 17.1 127 5.29 0.31 37 1.54 0.09
Total 810 1,793 2.2 322 0.40 0.18 115 0.14 0.06Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases 2008, 3:33 http://www.ojrd.com/content/3/1/33
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less than one year after the expiration of orphan drug mar-
ket exclusivity.
Discussion
Encouraging the development of orphan drugs
The study results revealed a modest impact of the 7-year
orphan drug market exclusivity on the overall orphan
NME drug patent and market exclusivity life. Nonetheless,
there is general agreement that the ODA has encouraged
sponsors to develop and market orphan drugs in the U.S.
[2,7,11,14]. In the 25 years since the enactment of the
ODA in 1983, there were 322 NDA approvals for orphan
indications and diseases, representing a significant
increase in the number of orphan drugs available in the
market. Although orphan drug designations and approv-
als target a fraction of the almost 7,000 identified rare dis-
eases and conditions, the approval of these products does
not necessarily represent the real extent in which pharma-
ceutical R&D has benefited patients.
In spite of the positive effect of the ODA, it is not possible
to estimate how many of the orphan drugs would have
been approved in the absence of the ODA incentives [15].
For example, the OOPD had 15 sponsor commitments to
submit marketing authorizations for orphan drugs before
the approval of the ODA [16]. Other factors may explain
the increase in the number of orphan drugs. First, public
and private investment in pharmaceutical R&D increased
during the same period [17]. This increase in R&D could
facilitate the discovery and development of orphan drugs
per se and as a byproduct of research for non-orphan dis-
eases and conditions [18]. Second, other U.S. regulations,
specifically the Waxman-Hatch Act and the Prescription
Drug User Fee Act increased the general pharmaceutical
patent and market exclusivity periods. Third, advances in
science and technology, specially the development of the
biotechnology industry also affected orphan drug R&D
[7,9,17]. In fact, the first product brought to the market by
top US biotechnology companies according to sales was
an orphan drug [6]. Fourth, after approval of the Small
Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, the NIH
dedicated part of its R&D budgets to grants for small busi-
nesses, which are more prone to target orphan drugs. Dur-
ing the period 1982–2007, over $12 billion were awarded
by the program to various small businesses in health care
and other areas of research [19]. Fifth, several public initi-
atives including the Orphan drugs Board and the NIH
ORD also encouraged development of orphan drugs.
Sixth, orphan diseases patient groups advocating for
orphan drug R&D have increased significantly during the
study period [6]. Seventh, substantial changes in FDA
review procedures occurred during the study period that
reduced the time required for drug approval and allowed
for limited commercial distribution of unapproved drugs
[20]. Finally, the demand for orphan drug products may
be increased through the effect of public programs that
finance an important part of the inpatient and outpatient
pharmaceutical expenditures in the U.S. [21].
Understanding the sponsors
Companies representing smaller and newer entities, uni-
versities, and private investigators from independent enti-
ties have already been noted as OD sponsors [15]. This
study found that almost two-thirds of the sponsors had
only 1 orphan designation. The importance of the smaller
sponsors is demonstrated by the fact that 75% of the dis-
eases targeted by orphan designations had only one spon-
sor. This study also revealed the complex relationship
between orphan sponsors and products, with products
having several orphan designations, and with several
sponsors and multiple orphan designations for the same
sponsor [7,15].
Given that orphan drugs are often identified during stud-
ies to treat diseases in larger patient populations, greater
participation by large companies with hundreds of prod-
ucts in development should be expected [9]. The relatively
small number of orphan drugs developed by large compa-
nies may be explained by priorities that emphasize
research toward drugs with a larger potential for profit
[17,22]. The more efficient prioritization of R&D projects
by large companies may also explain why large companies
were more successful in achieving FDA approval for their
orphan designations.
Also, the lower proportion of smaller companies with
non-orphan NMEs could be attributed to the characteris-
tics of these companies. In that small companies may be
aligned to compete in broad therapeutic classes, but they
are also able to target orphan drug niches, which may not
require high R&D costs and large scale marketing efforts
[23]. Furthermore, when an orphan drug is the only alter-
native available in the market for a disease, public and pri-
vate programs are likely to facilitate the diffusion of
information about the product to patients and health pro-
fessionals, thus reducing marketing costs. If experience
with the FDA approval process is a barrier, the smaller
companies may benefit from the FDA research design
assistance program for orphan drug development [9].
Clearly, future research is needed to better understand the
relationship among drug sponsors, products and the
incentives for orphan drug R&D options with respect to
the dynamics of their existing environment.
The role of economic incentives
The FDA did not establish special procedures or safety and
efficacy standards for approval of orphan drugs; nonethe-
less, orphan drugs had shorter development time than
other drugs. The FDA has been flexible in the require-
ments for approval of orphan drugs, especially for drugsOrphanet Journal of Rare Diseases 2008, 3:33 http://www.ojrd.com/content/3/1/33
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designated to treat serious or lifethreatening illnesses
[20,24]. Under these circumstances, since the majority of
orphan products were approved to treat serious and life
threatening illness or to provide a treatment where no
adequate therapy exists they were more likely to be
approved using the accelerated, Fast Track and priority
review procedures [10]. Moreover, resources allocated by
the public sector to support orphan drug R&D allow sin-
gle-product sponsors to participate in orphan R&D that,
otherwise, could not assume the risk and opportunity cost
associated with developing such products [7]. While dif-
ferent sources report varying levels of orphan drug
approvals in oncology and other therapeutic areas [25],
for this study approximately 18% of the orphan drug des-
ignations between 1983 and 2000 were approved by the
FDA.
Tax incentives also reduce R&D costs, especially for estab-
lished for profit sponsors. The tax incentives operate when
the company that is developing the orphan drug has
income from sales of other products and from commer-
cial distribution of unapproved orphan drugs or royalties.
Hence, tax credits and FDA fee waivers may serve as incen-
tives for sponsors to apply for orphan designation in cases
where the seven-year orphan drug market exclusivity
period is superseded by the effective patent life. Grants
also facilitate the participation of sponsors that develop
orphan drugs but do not market them. Although grants
permit the prioritization of R&D for orphan drugs with
input from the public sector, these grants are primarily
given to academic-based researchers and less frequently to
pharmaceutical companies.
From the consumers' perspective, taxpayers could end up
paying twice for orphan drugs. First, taxpayers may end up
paying for orphan R&D through grants, tax credits, and
the cost of FDA and other public agencies support to
sponsors. Second, later payments for the cost of orphan
drugs appear in public health care programs such as Medi-
care and Medicaid. Despite the economic and marketing
tradeoffs, the ODA has ensured the development and
marketing of orphan drugs in an environment driven by
consumer demand for treatments where no adequate
therapy exists.
Orphan drug market exclusivity
This study estimates and compares the barriers to compe-
tition added by the Orphan Drug Act Exclusivity, the Wax-
man-Hatch Act exclusivity and the patent life. These three
barriers are technically different. The patent life offers the
broadest level of protection and patents may cover phar-
maceutical compositions, indications or uses, dosage
forms, or manufacturing processes. A valid patent protects
a drug product from both generic and full NDA FDA
approvals. Nevertheless, patents listed in the Orange Book
are often invalid or do not protect the drug from generic
or full NDA competition [12]. The Orphan Drug Exclusiv-
ity offers the second broadest level of protection because
the provision protects the Orphan designated indication
against generic and full NDA approval. After the introduc-
tion of 5-year market exclusivity under the Waxman-
Hatch Act in 1984, the additional exclusivity granted to
NMEs by the orphan drug exclusivity is only two years. Yet
the Waxman-Hatch Act is the less restrictive toward the
barriers to competition because the Act protects NDAs
only against generic competition. In practice, however,
these exclusivities are the most restrictive toward the bar-
riers to competition as demonstrated by the fact that no
NME generic or full NDA competitor was approved before
the expiration of those exclusivities. The FDA monitors
the status of the Waxman-Hatch Act exclusivities and the
patents listed in the OB before considering a generic appli-
cation for approval. The FDA also monitors the status of
the Orphan drug exclusivity before considering a generic
or full NDA application for approval.
The relatively low percentage of NMEs with generic entry
immediately after the expiration of orphan drug exclusiv-
ity indicates that patents and other market factors, such as
small patient populations and low expected profits, are
also important barriers to generic entry. In fact, taking into
account that only one in seven drugs had more OD exclu-
sivity than patent life, and that only 1 in seven of those
drugs OD exclusivity been the largest protection had
generic competition; only 1 in 10 NME Orphan drugs
benefited directly from the ODA exclusivity. These results
contrasted with previous findings that indicated that the
orphan drug market exclusivity provision was the strong-
est of ODA incentives [15,26].
Conclusion
Public programs, federal regulations, and policies support
orphan drugs R&D. Grants, research design support, FDA
fee waivers, tax incentives, orphan drug market exclusiv-
ity, and public diffusion of orphan innovation are main
incentives for orphan R&D. Most of these incentives were
established by the ODA in 1983. Other factors including
the expanding role of the NIH, scientific advances and
other drug and patent regulatory changes also could
explain the increase in orphan approvals that occurred in
the past 25 years.
A large number of small sponsors also participate in
orphan drug R&D and marketing. Grants and other public
support programs are efficient ways to reduce the finan-
cial risk associated with orphan drug R&D. At the same
time, the competitive nature of the US grant system allows
for public prioritization of orphan drug R&D. As revealed
in this study, orphan NMEs had significantly shorter FDA
review time because a higher percentage of orphan drugsOrphanet Journal of Rare Diseases 2008, 3:33 http://www.ojrd.com/content/3/1/33
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were approved under priority review and accelerated
review procedures.
Despite these advantages, orphan NMEs had a statistical
significant less effective patent and market exclusivity life
than other NMEs. However, orphan NMEs also experi-
enced less generic competition than other NMEs. In sum-
mary, the 7-year orphan drug market exclusivity provision
had a positive yet relatively modest overall impact on
effective patent and market exclusivity life. Besides con-
sumer demand for innovative new drug products and
devices, supply-side efforts such as grants, FDA fee waivers
and tax credits may explain why drugs with orphan desig-
nation is pursued in the marketplace.
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